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Abstract 
Arguments in favor of an individual moral right to keep and 
bear firearms typically appeal to the value of guns as a 
reasonable means of self-defense. This is, for the most part, an 
empirical claim. If it were shown that allowing private gun 
ownership would lead to an overall net increase in crime or 
other social harms, then the strength of a putative right to own 
a gun would be diminished. But would it be defeated 
completely? I do not think so, and indeed I want to suggest in 
this paper that even if the harms outweigh the benefits, that 
neither an outright ban on handguns nor restrictive 
discretionary ownership policies are justified as an initial 
reaction. In other words, given that the overall harms outweigh 
the overall benefits, the default position is still one in favor of 
reasonably permissive gun laws over a total ban or restrictive 
discretionary policies. 
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hortly after the 2014 Isla Vista shootings, Samuel 
Wurzelbacher—better known to many as ‘Joe the 
Plumber’ during the 2008 presidential election—penned an 
open letter to the parents of the victims in which he 
remarked that “[a]s harsh as this sounds—your dead kids 
don’t trump my Constitutional rights.”i Although the 
insensitive tone of his comments drew a swift backlash 
from both sides of the political spectrum, Wurzelbacher’s 
letter touched on a legitimate point: rights are supposed to 
resist appeals to negative consequences. As Dworkin 
(1984) famously put it (and as Wurzelbacher 
unintentionally echoed), rights are ‘trumps.’ How then 
should we understand the relationship between the benefits 
and harms of private gun ownership? 
 
When it comes to guns, arguments in favor of an individual 
moral right to keep and bear firearms typically appeal to the 
value of guns as a reasonable means of self-defense.ii This 
is, for the most part, an empirical claim. If it were shown 
that allowing private gun ownership would lead to an 
overall net increase in crime or other social harms, then the 
strength of a putative right to own a gun would be 
diminished. But would it be defeated completely? I do not 
think so, and indeed I want to suggest in this paper that 
even if the harms outweigh the benefits, that neither an 
outright ban on handguns nor restrictive discretionary 
ownership policies are justified as an initial reaction. In 
other words, given that the overall harms outweigh the 
                                                 
i Wurzelbacher (2014). 
ii See Wheeler (1997), Hughes and Hunt (2000), Huemer (2003), Hall 
(2006), Stell (2006), Hunt (2011), and Bernstein et al. (2015: 
forthcoming). I use ‘guns’ and ‘handguns’ synonymously in this paper. 
S 
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overall benefits, the default position is still one in favor of 
reasonably permissive gun laws over a total ban or 
discretionary policies. 
 
Let us suppose both that individuals have a prima facie 
right to own a gun and that handgun ownership under 
permissive gun laws leads to more social harms than it is 
supposed to prevent.iii In such a scenario, two questions 
present themselves. First, is a mere outweighing of negative 
consequences sufficient to defeat an individual moral right 
to own a gun? Second, given that gun ownership leads to 
more harms than benefits, what type of gun policy should 
we enact? Nicholas Dixon (1993; 1999; 2011) argues that a 
simple outweighing is enough to completely override the 
strength of any putative right to own a gun, and hence 
advocates a total ban on handgun ownership. By contrast, 
David DeGrazia (2014a; 2014b) takes a self-described 
‘moderate’ position, recommending instead a restrictive 
discretionary policy under which handgun ownership is 
permitted only for those who can demonstrate a special 
need and who pass a rigorous course in handgun safety. 
This paper argues that neither approach is preferable and 
that gun ownership should instead be subject to non-
discretionary oversight. I give two arguments against Dixon 
and DeGrazia’s proposals. The first argument, which, like 
Dixon’s argument, is framed in terms of utilitarian 
considerations, holds that a reasonable gun policy is one 
                                                 
iii This is a dubious assumption, but one that I grant for the sake of 
argument. Kovandzic et al. (2013) found that a 10% increase in 
noncriminal gun prevalence would substantially reduce both the gun 
homicide and total homicide rates. Kleck (2015) assessed 41 English-
language studies and found that those claiming to support the ‘more 
guns, more crimes’ hypothesis failed to control for three critical 
methodological problems. However, “research that avoids or minimizes 
these flaws consistently finds no support for the hypothesis.”  
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that, all things considered, minimizes the social harms of 
guns while maximizing their benefits. Since guns provide 
numerous and very real benefits to many people, an effort 
should be made to maximize these benefits while 
minimizing their harms. This implies that at least some 
people should be allowed to own guns, for even if gun 
ownership leads to more harms than benefits, it does not 
follow that the immediate utility-maximizing solution is to 
enact a total ban on private gun ownership. Thus, a total 
ban is justified only as a last resort. According to the 
second argument, which is framed in terms of rights, both a 
total ban and restrictive discretionary policies violate the 
rights of those for whom gun ownership is not 
counterproductive. Even if gun ownership on average 
results in a net increase in social harms, it is false to say 
that therefore the prima facie right of every person to own a 
gun is defeated. For many individuals, defensive gun 
ownership is beneficial both to themselves and others. 
Hence these persons have an undefeated prima facie right 
to keep and bear firearms that ought to be respected by the 
state. A total ban clearly violates this requirement, and 
while DeGrazia’s moderate gun control avoids some of the 
problems associated with a total ban by permitting gun 
ownership for certain qualified persons, it too violates the 
rights of gun owners insofar as it requires all prospective 
owners to justify their need to the state, a requirement 
which presumes that their right to own a gun has already 
been overridden. Additionally, ‘special need’ requirements 
misunderstand the purpose of gun ownership. What 
justifies the right to own guns is not the risk of unjust attack 
(which, for most people, is very low), but the effectiveness 
they contribute in fending off unjust attacks when they do 
happen to occur. It is therefore inappropriate to require that 
prospective gun owners demonstrate a need that goes 
beyond the desire for a reasonable means of self-defense. 
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I. THE DEFENSIVE BENEFITS OF GUNS 
 
It is a fact that guns provide considerable defensive 
benefits. Simple armchair reflection reveals that guns are 
especially suited toward this end. Guns are commonly 
touted as equalizers that control for physical disparities that 
are often exploited in violent crimes. It is no wonder that 
the empirical evidence indicates that guns are frequently 
used for self-defense. According to a 2013 report by the 
Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 
“[a]lmost all national survey estimates indicate that 
defensive gun uses by victims are at least as common as 
offensive uses by criminals, with estimates of annual uses 
ranging from about 500,000 to more than 3 million per 
year, in the context of about 300,000 violent crimes 
involving firearms in 2008.”iv Perhaps the most famous of 
these surveys, conducted by Kleck and Gertz (1995), found 
that guns were used defensively more around 2.5 million 
times each year in the United States. Even if this number is 
exaggerated, as critics sometimes allege, it is no 
exaggeration that there are a large number of defensive gun 
uses, and that this number is non-trivial.v  
                                                 
iv Leshner et al. (2013: 15). Those interested in reading about particular 
instances where guns were used defensively can consult the National 
Rifle Association’s Armed Citizen database, which collects news stories 
of defensive gun uses. <http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/armed-
citizen.aspx>  
v Critics of Kleck and Gertz sometimes argue that their numbers are 
inconsistent with estimates taken from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS). However, as Kleck (1997a; 1997b; 
2001) points out, the NCVS is not specifically designed to measure 
defensive gun use. Additionally, an anonymous reviewer objects that 
‘the reporting of self-defense with a gun is problematic because in 
many of these studies, the stats can be skewed because an individual 
can believe that owning a gun has led to greater safety by preventing 
harm. Hence, according to the gun owner, the gun has helped defend 
his or her family.’ However this is simply not true. The surveys in 
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In addition to the frequency of defensive uses, numerous 
studies have found that resisting violent crime with a gun is 
correlated with lower injury rates.vi Indeed, it has been 
consistently found that forceful resistance with a gun is 
more effective at fending off violent attack than both 
resistance with other forceful means and non-resistance. 
Kleck and Delone (1993) assessed eight different forms of 
robbery resistance and found that “victim gun use was the 
resistance strategy most strongly and consistently 
associated with successful outcomes for robbery victims.” 
Southwick (2000) found that women who resisted an attack 
without a gun were four times more likely to be seriously 
injured than women who resisted with a gun. Men who 
resisted with a gun were also less likely to be seriously 
injured than men who either did not resist at all or who 
resisted without a gun.vii Kleck and Tark (2004: 861) 
assessed sixteen different forms of victim self-protection 
and found that “a variety of mostly forceful tactics, 
including resistance with a gun, appeared to have the 
strongest effects in reducing the risk of injury.” Guerette 
                                                                                                 
question queried situations in which a gun was used in order to prevent 
harm. What was measured was not merely the gun owner’s perception 
of safety given the presence of a gun in the home, but situations in 
which a gun actually contributed to repelling an attack. See Kleck 
(1997a: 186-187, table 5.1) for a comparison of fifteen surveys. 
vi Leshner et al. (2013: 16), summarizing the literature, concluded that 
“[s]tudies that directly assessed the effect of actual defensive uses of 
guns (i.e., incidents in which a gun was “used” by the crime victim in 
the sense of attacking or threatening an offender) have found 
consistently lower injury rates among gun-using crime victims 
compared with victims who used other self-protective strategies.” 
vii Confirming the equalizer thesis, Southwick (2000: 363) also found 
that when ‘the defender has a gun and the attacker has a gun, has some 
other weapon, or has no weapon, there was no significant difference 
between the injury probability or the loss probability between men and 
women. It would appear that having a gun really does result in 
equalizing a woman with a man.’  
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and Santana (2010) found that the odds of robbery and rape 
completion were decreased by 93 and 92 percent when a 
victim resisted with a gun. It should also be noted that in 
the vast majority of cases where guns were used 
defensively, the gun was not fired. According to Kleck 
(1999: 297), “there are about 7,700 to 18,500 reported legal 
shootings of criminals a year, which would be less than 1% 
of all defensive gun uses. The rest of defensive gun uses, 
then, involve neither killings nor woundings but rather 
misses, warning shots fired, or guns used to threaten, by 
pointing them or verbally referring to them.” Lott (2010) 
found that in most cases, simply brandishing a gun was 
sufficient to repel an attack.  
 
Since individuals have a right to self-defense, and since 
handguns are a reasonable means of self-defense, these 
considerations suggest at the very least that there is a prima 
facie right to own a gun for self-defense. There is also an 
additional argument from liberty: If private ownership of 
some item does not involve any intrinsic evil, then there is 
a defeasible presumption in favor of allowing individuals to 
own said item. Since handgun ownership is not in itself 
intrinsically evil, there is a defeasible presumption in favor 
of private ownership of handguns. The burden of proof is 
on the prohibitionist or restrictionist to justify any proposed 
gun control measures, a burden that is implicitly accepted 
by most gun control advocates when they appeal to the 
harms of gun ownership.  
 
Taking stock of these points, Huemer (2003: 303) 
concludes that “[i]t is difficult to deny the existence of at 
least a prima facie right to own a gun… Most gun control 
advocates would claim, not that there is not even a prima 
facie right to own a gun, but that the right is a minor one, 
and that the harms of private gun ownership, in 
comparison, are very large.” Indeed, both Dixon and 
Essays in Philosophy 16(2) 
 
187 
 
DeGrazia take this position, as does LaFollete (2000). 
Although they acknowledge the existence of a right to own 
a gun, they see this right as weakly grounded and easily 
overridden.viii Even amongst pro-gun philosophers, the 
structure, scope, and strength of the right to own a gun is a 
matter of dispute.ix But whatever else it may involve, there 
is agreement on both sides that the right to own a gun is at 
least a derivative right whose strength depends (in some 
sense) on the weighing of harms and benefits.  
 
On this point, the same thing that makes guns especially 
suitable for self-defense also makes them suitable to 
malicious use and liable to deadly accidents. Many have 
argued that gun ownership is correlated with higher rates of 
suicides, accidents, and homicides, and that these harms 
outweigh any benefits that guns may provide. Although I 
think that the empirical evidence here has been overstated, I 
am assuming for the sake of argument that the overall 
social harms incurred as a result of permissive gun 
ownership outweigh their self-defense benefits. My point in 
mentioning the defensive benefits of guns is simply to 
highlight the seemingly obvious fact that guns do provide a 
very real and substantial benefit to self-defense. These 
benefits still count for something even if they are 
outweighed by the overall harms of gun ownership.x  
 
                                                 
viii See Baker (2014) and Hunt (2011) for a critique of their derivation 
of the right to own a gun. 
ix For example, Wheeler (1997) and Hall (2003) analyze the strength of 
gun rights in terms of risk, whereas Huemer (2003), Hunt (2011), and 
Baker (2014) analyze gun rights in terms of a basic means-to-end 
condition. 
x Even outweighed rights exert residual force that require us to ensure 
that any trumping is no more than is necessary to uphold a more 
important interest, and perhaps to render restitution for damages 
incurred. 
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II. AGAINST PROHIBITIONISM 
 
It is sometimes thought that if it were shown that allowing 
private gun ownership resulted in more overall social harms 
than benefits, that this would be sufficient in justifying a 
total ban on gun ownership. Dixon seems to think so, but 
this does not follow—even if he is right that a total ban 
would reduce homicide rates. If we reason with the aim of 
utility maximization, then public policy decisions should 
attempt to minimize social harms while maximizing 
benefits. This is neutral with respect to what particular gun 
control policy we adopt. When it comes to guns, we want a 
gun policy that not only minimizes their social harms, but 
one that also maximizes their benefits. Given that there are 
strong and substantial defensive benefits associated with 
gun ownership, a reasonable gun policy is one that attempts 
to maximize these defensive benefits while minimizing the 
harms. This can be done, at least in principle, without 
enacting a total ban on gun ownership for everyone. So it is 
not the case that a mere outweighing is by itself sufficient 
to justify a total ban, even if it would achieve its desired 
goals. More needs to be said. 
 
Again, suppose that gun ownership under permissive laws 
leads to an overall net increase in social harms. The key 
word here is ‘net.’ Even though guns may lead to more 
overall social harm, there remain certain persons for whom 
gun ownership would be effective at stopping or preventing 
crime. Saying that gun ownership increases overall harm 
does not tell us who would benefit from gun ownership and 
who wouldn’t. Since we want a gun policy that maximizes 
their benefits and minimizes their harms, it would be 
overreaching and reckless to ban guns for everyone without 
first attempting to implement a less restrictive solution that 
preserves their benefits. In other words, the proper response 
is not to ban guns, but to develop a system restrictive 
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enough so that it minimizes the social harms of guns, but 
that at the same time is also permissive enough so that it 
maximizes the benefits provided by guns by allowing only 
competent persons to own them. We want a system that can 
reliably keep guns out of the ‘wrong’ hands while allowing 
the ‘right’ hands to own them. By jumping straight to the 
most restrictive method without considering other 
potentially viable solutions that fall short of a ban, Dixon’s 
utilitarian argument for a handgun ban actually runs 
counter to utilitarian reasoning. What is needed is an 
argument that a ban is preferable over other less restrictive 
solutions, which Dixon does not provide. 
 
Consider other risky activities that the state does not ban 
wholesale, even though the harms seemingly outweigh the 
benefits. Excessive alcohol consumption, for instance, is 
associated with more than 88,000 deaths annually.xi Yet 
the state does not ban alcohol, even though the health 
benefits of alcohol consumption are relatively minor when 
compared to the lives saved by using guns in self-defense. 
Instead, the state enacts measures so as to minimize the 
irresponsible consumption of alcohol while 
simultaneously recognizing the rights of those who can 
responsibly consume alcohol by allowing qualified 
persons to imbibe. A complete ban on alcohol may, we 
suppose, achieve the end of harm-reduction, but such a 
policy needlessly eliminates the many social benefits 
associated with alcohol. If such a policy is justified with 
respect to alcohol, then it is all the more justified when it 
comes to gun ownership, especially given the substantial 
benefits of guns considered earlier.  
 
Hence, an outright ban should not be our immediate 
recourse, since it focuses only on minimizing harms and 
                                                 
xi Centers for Disease Control (2013). 
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ignores benefits completely. While an outright ban may 
have a positive effect on overall crime reduction, it 
inherently excludes many individuals for which gun 
ownership would otherwise be beneficial. A gun policy that 
focuses on minimizing gun-related harm and maximizing 
gun-related benefits is likely to have a stronger effect at 
crime reduction than just a policy that focuses only on 
minimizing gun-related harms. This is true even if a ban is 
in everyone’s interest and even if all guns are removed 
from criminals. Although a total ban may decrease or 
completely eliminate malicious usage of guns, it is 
plausible to suppose that there will still be many situations 
in which guns are necessary for resisting crime, such as 
those involving significant disparities in force and physical 
ability. Given the substantial benefits that guns provide in 
resisting crime, there ought to be provisions under which 
certain citizens can acquire guns for self-protection.  
 
There is also a rights-based argument against an outright 
ban. This argument proceeds from the claim that prima 
facie rights should be presumed weighty unless shown to 
be defeated or overridden. Given that there are many 
people for whom gun ownership is or would be beneficial, 
their prima facie right to own a gun is undefeated and 
ought to be respected by the state. It is a mistake to think 
that because gun ownership on average leads to more 
social harms, that therefore each individual instance of 
gun ownership likewise leads to more social harms and is 
therefore overridden or defeated. Respecting the 
undefeated rights of those for whom gun ownership is 
beneficial is compatible with restricting the rights of those 
for whom gun ownership is likely to be counterproductive. 
Thus, a blanket prohibition is prima facie unjust because it 
is not narrowly tailored to its intended goal. As was the 
case with the utilitarian argument, the state’s first recourse 
should be to find a less restrictive way of controlling for 
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the negative effects of firearms instead of jumping straight 
to a total ban.  
 
In responding to a similar argument from Huemer (who 
appeals to the well-known example of the utilitarian judge), 
Dixon claims that a handgun ban would not violate the 
rights of the few because “we do not know in advance who 
the unlucky ‘losers’ from handgun prohibition would be.” 
Additionally, since prohibition is “in everyone’s best 
interests, it does not sacrifice a person’s rights for the 
benefit of others, which is what does happen when the 
innocent person is executed.”xii  
 
Both of these claims are implausible.xiii First, why think a 
right can only be violated if the identity of the rights-bearer 
is known to the violator? Dixon gives no argument for this 
claim, which seems obviously false. A terrorist who 
indiscriminately detonates a bomb in the middle of a 
crowded city center may not know who he kills, but surely 
he has still violated the rights of his victims. Second, it is 
simply not true that a policy that results in greater net 
safety does not violate the rights of the few for whom 
safety is compromised. It is puzzling why Dixon asserts 
this, especially when the argument he is responding to is 
supposed to respond to this very claim. The utilitarian 
judge who sentences an innocent person to death in order to 
pacify a riotous mob presumably does so because it will 
bring about more safety than it would if the innocent person 
were set free. Yet clearly the innocent person’s rights are 
still violated, even though his execution would increase 
safety by preventing deaths and property destruction from 
rioting. Dixon might respond by saying that this principle is 
only true in cases where everyone benefits from a safety 
                                                 
xii Dixon (2011: 161). 
xiii Also see Baker (2014) for a response. 
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increase. Since the condemned innocent is not better off as 
a result of the judge’s action, this example is not analogous. 
But even if this is true, it only serves to undercut Dixon’s 
argument. Since a gun ban will very likely result in some 
persons being worse-off in virtue of being deprived of a 
reasonable means of self-defense, it is false that everyone 
would benefit from a gun ban. Thus, Dixon’s argument 
becomes irrelevant.  
 
Another prohibitionist objection might be that since the 
state cannot reliably identify in advance those for whom 
gun ownership is counterproductive, that therefore a total 
ban is justified as the only possible way of reducing the 
harms of gun ownership.xiv However, this objection only 
works if there is no reliable pre-screening method that is 
less restrictive than a total ban, a thesis which seems quite 
implausible on the face of things.xv It is incumbent on the 
proponent of a total ban to produce empirical arguments as 
to why this is probably the case. Pointing out a mere 
possibility is not enough.  
 
                                                 
xiv Huemer (2003: 303) suggests this response on behalf of the 
prohibitionist. 
xv If we look at data regarding the firearms-related revocation rates of 
individuals licensed to carry concealed weapons, we can see that at 
least one form of pre-screening schema is effective at excluding those 
for whom some kind of firearms-related activity is counterproductive. 
Lott et al. (2014) notes that revocation rates for Florida, Michigan, and 
Texas (states which account for 2.5 million of over 11.1 million current 
licensees) are extremely low. In the case of Florida, the annual rate of 
firearms-related violations by concealed weapons license holders is 
0.003 percent, compared to a national rate of 0.007 percent for police 
officers. Those who are licensed to carry concealed weapons appear to 
be extremely law-abiding. It is not far-fetched to think that a similar 
system would be effective at detecting those for whom gun ownership 
in general is counterproductive. 
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One might charge my argument thus far as having made 
this same mistake. Perhaps it is the case that a less 
restrictive form of gun control is preferable to a ban. 
Nevertheless, since we are interested in the actual weighing 
of harms and benefits, any alternative proposals will have 
to be justified by the empirical evidence, otherwise they are 
unsubstantiated possibilities that carry no weight. This 
point is compatible with the claim that I am making, which 
is that less restrictive policies are, all other things being 
equal, in principle preferable to a more restrictive policy. 
What this means is that it incumbent upon a proponent of a 
more restrictive policy to justify its necessity against other 
policies that are less restrictive. Since we should not restrict 
autonomy beyond what is morally required, it is a good 
idea to explore various middle ground options before 
jumping to the extreme of banning gun ownership for 
everyone, even if it ultimately turns out that these middle 
ground options fail. There may be factors that weigh in 
favor of handgun prohibition, but a less restrictive policy is 
the default position. Accordingly, the success of Dixon’s 
utilitarian argument for handgun prohibition depends on his 
first ruling out other less restrictive means of gun control, 
which he fails to do. Dixon simply takes it for granted that 
a handgun ban is the proper utilitarian solution. As we have 
seen, this is not the case. 
 
III. AGAINST RESTRICTIVE LICENSING 
 
An outright ban on guns violates both utilitarian and 
deontological considerations. What about a restrictive 
discretionary system? Under such a policy, the decision as 
to whether some individual may be allowed to own a gun is 
left to law enforcement or government officials to decide 
on a case-by-case basis. The rationale behind this policy is 
intuitive. As DeGrazia explains, it is based on the 
“likelihood that, for some individuals, gun ownership is not 
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self-defeating. Arguably, their prerogative to own guns for 
the purpose of self-defense should not be curtailed just 
because gun ownership is self-defeating for the 
majority.”xvi Under such a system, prospective gun buyers 
would be required to demonstrate a special need for gun 
ownership, such as a high likelihood of attack due to one’s 
profession or social status. Thus, in many arenas where 
such a system is in effect, the mere desire for a reasonable 
means of self-defense does not qualify as a special need. 
Contrast this with a non-discretionary (‘shall-issue’) 
system, where all applicants who meet a list of objective 
criteria must be granted permission by the government.  
 
Although the reason for adopting a strict discretionary 
policy is rightly based on the desire to preserve the benefits 
of guns for those who are able to utilize them properly, any 
policy under which all individuals seeking to own a gun are 
required, among other things, to demonstrate a special need 
to own a gun that goes beyond mere self-defense will end 
up violating the rights of those for whom gun ownership 
would not be detrimental.  
 
First, given the scope of our discussion, it is unjust to 
require prospective gun owners to justify their need to own 
a gun. If an activity is not otherwise immoral, then the 
burden of proof is on the opponent of said activity to give a 
reason in favor of restricting it. Even in cases in which the 
state has a paternalistic interest in restricting certain risky 
activities that are not in themselves immoral, those who 
show themselves to be capable of sufficiently mitigating 
the associated risk should be allowed to partake in said 
activities. Since we are assuming that there is a prima facie 
right to own a gun, it is incumbent upon the state or 
licensing authority to provide a reason to override the 
                                                 
xvi DeGrazia (2014a: 17). 
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rights of prospective gun owners. Indeed, having a prima 
facie right to do something means that can one freely 
pursue some activity without having to justify his reason 
for doing so. Requiring someone to justify his reasons for 
exercising a right defeats the very purpose of having said 
right. For example, requiring someone to justify invoking 
his 5th Amendment right to not self-incriminate would 
defeat the purpose of having that right, for in the very act of 
doing so one makes statements that may be used against 
him. Rights function as reasons in themselves, such that 
their possession grants immunity from having to give 
further justificatory reasons.xvii By putting the burden of 
proof on all prospective gun owners to justify their need to 
own a gun, it is assumed that their prima facie right to own 
a gun is either non-existent or already overridden.  
 
This true even if gun ownership is on average 
counterproductive, for merely pointing out a fact about 
averages, which DeGrazia does, is not in itself sufficient to 
justify a system under which the prima facie rights of every 
prospective gun owner are presumed to be overridden. 
Rather, it suggests the need for a test of some kind that can 
reliably and objectively determine who is qualified to own 
a gun. Any such test must be structured to the benefit of 
applicants, such that it is the state’s job to find a 
disqualifying reason.xviii If no reason is found, then an 
                                                 
xvii Thanks to Victor Hohlacov for discussion on this point. 
xviii One might wonder if this rules out training requirements as well, 
since training requirements require an applicant to demonstrate 
competence, which might seem to assume that one’s right to own a gun 
is defeated until proven otherwise. This is not the case. Need-based 
requirements are unjustified because the very idea of having a right to 
engage in some activity precludes the need to give an additional reason 
to do so (the right itself functions as the reason). But since competence 
is presumed in having the right to own a gun (having the right to own a 
gun for self-defense assumes that one is capable of using a gun for that 
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applicant must be allowed to own a gun. This is exactly 
what a non-discretionary licensing system is supposed to 
offer. This is not to say that licensing standards cannot be 
rigorous, only that a just licensing system for handgun 
ownership must put the burden of proof on the licensing 
authority.xix The fair and equitable thing to do would be to 
allow anyone who meets an objective list of rigorous 
criteria the ability to purchase and own guns instead of 
requiring that every applicant justify their need.  
 
It might be objected that we use restrictive discretionary 
methods all the time in otherwise uncontroversial contexts. 
Don’t airport security lines presume that everyone is a 
potential terrorist (and hence their prima facie right to fly is 
defeated)? Don’t existing measures requiring background 
checks on guns purchased from a dealer with a Federal 
Firearms License presume that everyone is a potential 
criminal (and hence their prima facie right to buy a gun is 
defeated)? This is not the case. In both cases the burden of 
proof is on the regulating entity to find evidence that would 
disqualify someone from partaking in the relevant activity. 
Someone who wishes to fly does not have to justify their 
reason to the state, rather it is the state’s job to find 
                                                                                                 
purpose), the state may require proof of competency in order to exclude 
those who are unqualified from owning a gun. Such a requirement 
would be largely pro forma for those who are already qualified.  
xix Other problems with strict discretionary systems are practical and 
pertain to the fact that a licensing authority’s discretionary power is 
often unfairly applied in areas where such a policy is in effect. Snyder 
(1997) argues that “[t]he most serious problem with discretionary 
licensing systems is the broad discretionary power that is wielded by 
government officials. Historically... the problems have been 
discriminatory application of those laws based on race, national origin, 
or political activities. The contemporary problems with those laws, 
however, tend to be (a) discrimination based on population density; (b) 
class discrimination; (c) arbitrary, inconsistent, and irrational 
application of the law; and (d) favoritism or corruption.” 
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something that would disqualify said individual from 
flying. If no disqualifying factor is found, then individuals 
must be allowed to fly or purchase a firearm. There is, in 
other words, a presumption in favor of liberty that puts the 
burden of proof on those who wish to restrict others from 
rightfully partaking in an activity that falls under the scope 
of a prima facie right. It is not wrong to impose a test or 
some other standard in order to prevent certain ineligible 
individuals from partaking in an activity, so long as the test 
does not work by treating everyone’s right to partake in that 
activity as defeated until proven otherwise. While 
background checks and other pre-screening tests meet this 
requirement, a need-based test does not.  
 
Second, the requirement that prospective gun owners 
demonstrate a special need beyond mere self-defense 
misunderstands the core purpose of gun ownership. 
Presumably, someone who acquires a gun for self-
protection does so because a gun is quite useful in fending 
off violent attacks when they happen to occur. This is quite 
different from the risk of one’s being the victim of a violent 
attack.xx Consider a parallel example: Fire extinguishers are 
very useful in eliminating certain types of fires, even 
though the chances of a fire actually occurring are rare. 
Someone who owns a fire extinguisher presumably owns 
one not because the risk of a fire is exceedingly high, but 
because a fire extinguisher is very useful in putting out a 
fire should the need ever arise. The rationale for owning a 
fire extinguisher, first aid kit, or even a spare tire consists 
primarily in the fact that these items are very useful in 
fulfilling their intended purpose when they are needed, not 
in the likelihood that they will be needed (which, for most 
people, is exceedingly rare). Similarly, the rationale for 
owning a gun is so that one can fend off a violent attack 
                                                 
xx Baker (2014) critiques Dixon on this point. 
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when such a situation arises, even if these situations are 
rare.xxi Hence it is sometimes said by those who carry 
concealed weapons that they carry ‘for the stakes, and not 
the odds.’ That one may face a high risk of violent attack 
may provide additional reasons in favor of being allowed to 
purchase or carry a gun, but it cannot function as a 
minimum requirement to which all prospective gun owners 
are beholden. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Even if gun ownership leads to increases in social harms, 
there should still be a presumption in favor of non-
discretionary gun regulation, similar to what exists today 
with respect to ‘shall-issue’ concealed weapons licensing. 
The specifics of what such regulations would look like is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  I have argued only that the 
mere fact that the harms of gun ownership outweigh the 
benefits is not enough to immediately justify either a total 
ban or restrictive discretion. Again, this is not to say that a 
total ban or restrictive discretionary policy cannot ever be 
justified, only that it would be premature to adopt either 
policy as our initial response to dealing with the harms of 
gun ownership. Instead, a strict non-discretionary policy is 
better structured toward meeting the concerns of both gun 
control and gun rights advocates. With that in mind, my 
arguments here should be construed as providing a guide 
that directs the process of how we should go about making 
decisions about gun policy. Since the debate over the merits 
of gun ownership is largely an empirical issue, there may 
                                                 
xxi It is true that gun ownership may be more riskier than owning a fire 
extinguisher, given the greater harms that may arise from misuse, but 
this misses the point of the analogy. The claim is not that guns are just 
as safe as fire extinguishers, but that ownership of these items are 
justified on the basis of their effectiveness at handling emergencies, and 
not on the frequency with which they will need to be used. 
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be additional empirical considerations beyond a mere 
outweighing that weigh in favor of a particular gun 
policy.xxii Suffice it to say that decision-making about gun 
policy should start with the less restrictive methods of 
achieving the desired goal of reducing societal harms. 
Since a total ban and a restrictive discretionary policy are 
arguably the two most restrictive methods of reducing the 
harms of guns (with the former being more restrictive than 
the latter), they should be enacted only after other means 
have been exhausted. 
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